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Safety is a simple concept, but an abstract task, specifically with aircraft. One sim-
ple aberration from standard flight procedure and hundreds of individual lives are
at-risk. One critical safety system during flight is the Traffic Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS). TCAS protects against mid-air collisions by communicating an air-
craft’s location with the surrounding aircraft. If TCAS falters, the only protection
against a mid-air collision is the pilot’s ability to visually recognize a dangerous sit-
uation. This necessity of an operational TCAS warrants further investigation into
its shortcomings. Therefore, to understand its shortcomings, this thesis delves into
the technical specifications of TCAS and Mode S and presents a taxonomy of threats
and threat actors. The cause of these shortcomings is from an adversary intention-
ally targeting TCAS, rather than mechanical or design failure. The threat taxonomy
presents 4 threats, with false injection having the most substantial detriment to the
system. After broaching the threat taxonomy, the thesis further explores the re-
quirements for a successful false injection attack against TCAS. This includes timing
Mode S messages to satisfy the following requirements: a range test, an altitude test,
a received signal power test, and a directional heading requirement, or bearing con-
straint. Following requirement development, the thesis introduces the development of
a MATLAB simulation of a ground-based adversary targeting a Boeing 737-800 with
Mode S communications. The ground-based adversary false injects a spoofed Boeing
737-800 into the air picture. The program tests various ranges, altitudes, and bear-
ings for the target aircraft, ultimately comparing the results to the requirements of
TCAS. With verified and validated results, the thesis provides a clear threat picture
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A CYBER THREAT TAXONOMY AND A VIABILITY ANALYSIS FOR FALSE
INJECTIONS IN THE TCAS
I. Introduction
Air travel is the second most used mode of travel in the United States [1]. Over
1 billion travels use aircraft as their mode of transportation. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) is the primary policing force for air traffic standards. The
mission for the FAA focuses on providing safe aerospace systems for air travel users
[1]. The mission statement highlights the importance of safety in the air travel sector.
The FAA mandates aircraft have a collision avoidance system operational at all
times [2]. TCAS is the certified implementation of Aircraft Collision Avoidance Sys-
tem (ACAS). Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) protects against mid-air
collisions by monitoring the relative airspace of an aircraft. TCAS uses Mode S
transponder communications for collision avoidance. If an aircraft enters a specified
zone, the TCAS monitoring screen notifies the pilot and provides recommendations
on correcting the situation.
1.1 Motivation
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted experiments
using real world flights and simulations, and the results showed that without an op-
erational TCAS, 4 declared near mid-air collisions (less than 1000 feet horizontal and
200 feet vertical separation) occurred during 32 total flights [3]. With an operational
TCAS, zero near mid-air collisions occurred across 96 total flights. Without TCAS,
the probability for a near mid-air collision increased by 12.5 percent. Additionally,
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the study proved that TCAS is a premiere safety system, and when operational, there
is an almost zero percent chance for a mid-air flight collision occurring.
Another study focused on pilot trust in aircraft cyber-physical systems [2]. The
results demonstrated that TCAS is the most trusted system on the aircraft. Pilots
follow TCAS recommendations whenever provided with no distrust in the recommen-
dations.
Given two-way radio frequency capabilities, specifically the software-defined radio
(SDR), unequivocal trust in TCAS is not achievable nor is it prudent for passenger
safety [4]. SDRs provide a vector for adversaries to craft malicious RF messages,
including Mode S TCAS messages, to subvert pilot trust in TCAS. The ease of ob-
taining an SDR paired with the RF message processing and creation presents a threat
to the integrity of Mode S messages used by TCAS. These threats mandate further
investigation into potential attacks and capabilities.
1.2 Problem
This thesis focuses on TCAS security, both generally and specifically. It con-
tributes to the academic, professional, and industry understanding of TCAS vulner-
abilities. First, using open-source documents and reports, the thesis answers the
following question: What are the possible vulnerabilities/threat actors associated
with TCAS and its communication process? The thesis enumerates and characterizes
risks to TCAS. After risk are discussed, the prominent risk chosen to further explore
is a false injection.
False injection, also known as spoofing, presents a capability for a threat actor to
introduce distrust into the TCAS system. That distrust has second and third-order
effects that may have a potential impact on passenger safety. A previous study [4]
on TCAS spoofing occurred, but there were assumptions made. This thesis further
2
centers on determining specific requirements to implement the false injection attack.
This answers the question: What are the requirements to satisfy the range test,
altitude test, and bearing constraints of TCAS?
Lastly, with the false injection requirements known, the last contribution focuses
on simulating timing-based false injection attacks against TCAS. In specific, the
simulation implements a ground station, a target aircraft, a spoofed aircraft, and
all the requirements from the previous questions. This contribution answers the
following question: What conditions allow a ground-based adversary to appropriately
time responses and falsely-inject a realistic aircraft into a target aircraft’s TCAS,
eventually triggering an RA?
1.3 Organization
Chapter II provides necessary background knowledge of TCAS and Mode S. It
details TCAS processes and capabilities that support the threat taxonomy and the
methodology of the false injection program. Additionally, Chapter II presents TCAS
components to assist with understanding what is impacted during potential attacks.
Lastly, the chapter discusses TCAS warning notifications and their respective thresh-
olds.
Chapter III presents a novel threat actor model and TCAS attack taxonomy. The
chapter classifies TCAS threat actors from various other cyber threat models. Second,
the chapter examines the capabilities of those threat actors. Third, the chapter defines
an attack taxonomy using previous studies in other cyber-physical aircraft systems,
presenting them in a formalized threat tree. Lastly, the chapter compares the actors
with potential attacks, determining likely attacks by particular threat actors,
Chapter IV studies and presents requirements for timing, the range test, altitude
test, power test, and bearing constraints. Additionally, the chapter discusses the
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methodology in creating a simulation to implement those requirements during a false
injection attack against a target aircraft, B737, from a ground-based attacker. Also,
the chapter presents and implements how TCAS tracks and projects paths of aircraft
and speed/turning capabilities of simulated aircraft. Lastly, the chapter discusses
starting ranges, altitudes, and bearings of target aircraft, determining the ending
horizontal time to impact (TAU) values for warning notification threshold comparison.
Chapter V analyzes the results from the simulation in Chapter IV. The chapter
presents the average TAU values of each set of 500 simulations and determines which
range, altitude, and starting bearing combination present a false injection vulnera-
bility. Additionally, the chapter provides a statistical analysis of the skewness and
kurtosis of the data, and compares them against normal distribution requirements.
Lastly, the chapter presents the percentage of success for each starting range, altitude,
and bearing, resulting in the development of threat maps for pilots.
Chapter VI discusses the impact of the simulation results and the attack taxonomy.
Also, the chapter presents rudimentary solutions to the issues and discusses future
work possibilities of TCAS security research. Lastly, Chapter VII concludes the thesis
and overviews all work performed.
1.4 Scope
Initially, this thesis analyzes the threats of TCAS and its communications pro-
cesses. Afterward, the thesis details the methodology and requirements for the false
injection attack. The limitations relate to physical access to a non-stationary TCAS
system. All data regarding TCAS communications comes from technical mandates
and previous experiments, rather than physical access to a TCAS system.
Additionally, the false injection simulation focuses on the B737. It is the most
widely-used commercial aircraft in flight operations around the world [5]. With ad-
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justed parameters for aircraft, the false injection attack and partnering simulation
apply to other aircraft. The simulation focuses on the cruising sector of a flight pro-
file. At this point, the target B737 is at its cruising speed with an altitude that
remains relatively constant. The takeoff and landing section of the flight profile are
not analyzed.
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II. Introduction to Mode S and TCAS
This chapter discusses the history of Mode S and TCAS. Additionally, the chapter
presents a detailed overview of Mode S and TCAS, along with its components. This
knowledge is vital in understanding components of the TCAS threat taxonomy and
false injection requirements detailed in future chapters.
2.1 History of Mode S and TCAS
The creation of Mode S started with the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system
[6]. Great Britain developed the IFF system during World War II. It created the sys-
tem to determine if an aircraft was friendly or hostile. The base components include
a ground-based transmitter used to broadcast radio signals and a transponder that
receives and replies to signals. Aircraft equipped with IFF respond to interrogation
modes employed by specific countries and/or alliances. If an interrogated aircraft
responds correctly, the interrogating aircraft labels it as friendly. Contrarily, if an
interrogated aircraft responds incorrectly or IFF cannot decipher the signal, the inter-
rogating aircraft labels it as an unknown aircraft, or as hostile. As air travel increased
across the United States, air traffic control (ATC) required more robust identification
capabilities than IFF [6]. In 1975, this requirement resulted in the development of
Mode S that offers identification capabilities and increased data transmission size. In
parallel to the development of Mode S, the need for a mid-air collision system came
to light.
On June 30, 1956, a mid-air collision between two aircraft occurred near the
Grand Canyon in Arizona, resulting in the death of 128 individuals [7]. Four years
later, there was a collision in New York City resulting in the death of 134 individuals
[7]. These catastrophes identified a lack of safety, prompting the ATC evolution
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and necessitating technology updates to aircraft radar systems. In 1961, due to the
mid-air collisions, President Kennedy ordered the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to conduct a review of current aviation technology and create a long-term plan
to enhance air safety [6]. The plan consensus was creating an improved radar system,
known as the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS).
ATCRBS follows the same interrogation principle as TCAS; interrogations broad-
cast from an antenna and any aircraft equipped with ATCRBS would then respond [6].
ATCRBS uses 1030 MHz and 1090 MHz frequencies and two types of interrogators.
The interrogators were Mode A and Mode C. Mode A identified the aircraft, while
Mode C determined the aircraft’s altitude. Due to growth limitations, in 1971, the
FAA began specifying a new system that would help improve air traffic safety while
ensuring backward compatibility with ATCRBS. The FAA committee developed the
requirements for the new system and contracted the physical implementation of the
system to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL).
They developed Discrete Address Beacon System (DABS), later known as Mode S.
Mode S requirements included backwards compatibility with Mode A and Mode C.
Also, MIT-LL decided to have Mode S use addresses to interrogate aircraft and reduce
radio frequency traffic.
In parallel to the development of Mode S, the FAA also asked for the creation of
a collision detection system [7]. A number of systems were created and tested; how-
ever, an exorbitant number of false alarms occurred. In 1974, Andrew Zeitlin and the
MITRE center began creating the capability for a system to perform aerial surveil-
lance of its surroundings using its existing transponders [8]. During the development
of the system, two aircraft collided near San Diego airport resulting in the death of
144 individuals [7]. This incident forced the FAA to mandate the implementation of
an aerial surveillance system. The FAA decided to use the Mitre Center for Advanced
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Aviation System Development (CAASD) developed capability from 1974. CAASD
partnered with Lincoln Labs at Massachusetts Institute of Technology to finalize the
system, now known as TCAS [8]. In 1986, another collision occurred between two
aircraft in Mexico, resulting in 82 fatalities [7]. This led to the FAA mandating all
passenger and commercial aircraft to be equipped with TCAS in 1987 [7][8]. The last
major update to TCAS requirements was TCAS 7.1, implemented in 2011.
2.2 Overview of Mode S
A transponder is a radio transmitter and receiver combined to allow automatic
communications with aircraft and ground radar sites [9]. Mode S equipped aircraft
selectively interrogate other aircraft [10]. This occurs when an aircraft replies to an
original all-call or broadcast interrogation. Figure 1 displays a simple overview of the
communication dynamic for Mode S between an aircraft and a ground station.
Once a reply is received, the next Mode S interrogation specifies the aircraft by
its unique aircraft address, commonly referred to as the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) address. The ICAO address is a 24-bit address used to identify
aircraft. Mode S sends interrogations to other aircraft at 1030 MHz and sends/re-
ceives unencrypted responses at 1090 MHz, allowing for interception. Mode S uses
Uplink Format (UF) and Downlink Format (DF) for communications. UF is a spe-
cific interrogation originating from an aircraft asking specific addressable information
about another aircraft. DF is the reply from the aircraft. For UF interrogations,
TCAS uses UF-0, UF-11, and UF-16. For DF replies, TCAS uses DF-0, DF-11, and
DF-16 formats. Figure 2 presents the message formats for all of the above-listed UFs
and DFs.
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Mode S Ground 
Station
Mode S Equipped Aircraft
Figure 1: Mode S Communications Overview: Interrogations and Replies between
Aircraft and a Ground Station [9].
00000 VS: 1 7 RI: 4 2 AC: 13 AP: 24
01011 CA: 3 AA: 24 PI: 24
10000 VS: 1 7 RI: 4 2 AC: 13 MV: 56 AP: 24
10000 3 RL: 1 4 AQ: 1 18 MU: 56 AP: 24
01011 PR: 4 IC: 4 CL: 3 16 AP: 24






UPLINK FORMATS FOR TCAS
DOWNLINK FORMATS FOR TCAS
Short Air-to-Air Surveillance
Mode S All-Call Interrogation
Long Air-to-Air Surveillance
Short Air-to-Air Surveillance
Mode S All-Call Reply
Long Air-to-Air Surveillance
Figure 2: TCAS Uplink and Downlink Formats: The Mode S formats for TCAS
interrogations and responses [11].
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2.2.1 Mode S Acquisition
Mode S acquisition is the first step in TCAS communications [12]. The Mode S
system uses a squitter, an all-call broadcast interrogation, to interrogate surround-
ing aircraft. TCAS specifically uses the UF-11 (56-bit) format to send broadcast
interrogations to all surrounding aircraft. Those all-call interrogations contain an
interrogator code (IC). The IC is an address for the Mode S radar. Once an aircraft
receives the UF-11 interrogation, the aircraft decodes the IC and decides whether to
reply or ignore the interrogation. If the two aircraft have no previous communications,
then the aircraft replies with an all-call reply. If the two aircraft previously commu-
nicated, they are considered associated and Mode S discards the message. Once an
interrogating aircraft receives a DF-11 all-call reply, that aircraft decodes and checks
the IC and the ICAO address. The interrogating aircraft determines the position of
the aircraft by the reply. At this point, the associating process completes and TCAS
ignores all other all-call broadcasts. It is important to note that DF-17, known as an
extended squitter, offers the same capability for acquisition. After Mode S acquires
a target, selective interrogations begin.
2.2.2 Selective Interrogations
Once an aircraft locks onto another aircraft using all-call, the originating aircraft
sends selective interrogations using the ICAO address [12]. Upon selective interroga-
tion, an aircraft cannot respond to all-call broadcasts. For selective interrogations,
TCAS uses UF-0/DF-0 and UF-16/DF-16. TCAS uses UF-0/DF-0 for short air-to-
air interrogations. These formats belong specifically to TCAS/ACAS. DF-0 replies
include both the altitude and the ICAO address of the aircraft. Two other major
components of DF-0 replies include the vertical status (VS) and the reply informa-
tion (RI) field. The VS field indicates if the aircraft is in-flight or grounded. A VS
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value of 1 indicates an aircraft is airborne. A VS value of 0 indicates an aircraft
is grounded. The RI field is a four-bit word that relays the speed capability of the
aircraft.
UF-16/DF-16 is used for long air-to-air interrogations and surveillance for TCAS.
The major difference between UF-16/DF-16 and UF-0/DF-0 is the length. UF-
16/DF-16 is 112 bits long and UF-0/DF-0 is 56 bits long. They have many other
similar aspects. For example, DF-0 and DF-16 replies contain the reported altitude
and the ICAO address. Selective interrogations include a parity overlay. The ICAO
address is the parity overlay. It ensures the message contents do not have any errors.
Additionally, DF-16 replies contain the VS and RI fields. They both still indicate if
the plane is grounded and its speed capability. Additionally, the Altitude Code (AC)
field in both DF-16 and DF-0 replies is the reported altitude.
2.3 TCAS Overview and Components
TCAS [13] is an aviation-based system used as a protective measure against mid-
air collisions between aircraft. In the United States, TCAS is a required component
for all aircraft that carry 30 or more passengers. European regulations require aircraft
to have TCAS if carrying 20 or more passengers. TCAS [14] is comprised of different
components that allow the aircraft to process signals from other aircraft, send signals
to other aircraft, and make decisions regarding the data sent and received. The
components that comprise the TCAS system include the TCAS computer unit, the
Mode S transponder, the TCAS control panel, the antennas, and the display. Figure 3































Figure 3: TCAS Component Overview: All components of the TCAS system [14].
2.3.1 Computer Unit
The computer unit is the hub of the TCAS system [14]. It is responsible for air
surveillance, detection of possible threats, tracking of those threats once identified,
and tracking the plane’s altitude. The most important responsibility of the TCAS
computer unit is the RA determination and generation of advisories and avoidance
maneuvers. The computer unit notifies the pilots of imminent danger and offers a
maneuver solution to avoid collision with the threat.
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2.3.2 Mode S Transponder
TCAS uses the Mode S transponder to perform its communications between air-
craft [11]. The Mode S overview describes the Mode S communications used: UF-
0/DF-0, UF-11/DF-11, and UF-16/DF-16.
2.3.3 TCAS Control Panel
The TCAS control panel provides pilots manual control of the Mode S transponder
and TCAS system [14]. Mode S settings for pilots include:
• Transponder: In this setting, the Mode S transponder communicates with all
ground ATC systems and responds to TCAS interrogations from other planes;
however, the on-board TCAS system is in Stand-by Mode.
• Stand-by: The TCAS processor and Mode S transponder receive power; how-
ever, the TCAS system does not actively interrogate the airspace around the
aircraft. The aircraft’s transponder still replies to discrete interrogations, as
mandated by the FAA.
• TA Only: In this setting, the TCAS and Mode S transponder operate normally.
TCAS interrogates nearby aircraft and maintains a consistent and accurate air
picture. In this mode, the TCAS system only issues traffic alert (TA)s but not
resolution advisory (RA)s.
• Automatic or TA/RA: Automatic is the fully operational TCAS and Mode S
mode. TCAS conducts all tracking and alert notifications on board.
2.3.4 Antennas
In previous aircraft, four major antennas support the operations for TCAS [11]. In
modern-day aircraft, there are two antennas. Mode S and TCAS share the antennas.
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The TCAS antennas include a top-mounted directional antenna and either an
omnidirectional or directional antenna attached to the bottom of the aircraft. These
antennas transmit TCAS interrogations 360 degrees at 1030 MHz frequency. The
antenna mounted on the bottom of the aircraft does not transmit as many interro-
gations as the top antenna. Both transponders receive interrogation replies at 1090
MHz. Upon receiving interrogation replies, TCAS sends them to the computer unit.
The two Mode S antennas mount to the bottom and top of the aircraft. Reverse
the TCAS antennas, the Mode S antennas reply to interrogations at 1090 MHz and
receive those interrogations at 1030 MHz. Since all of the antennas share the same
frequencies, when one is transmitting, the other is disabled.
2.3.5 Displays
TCAS has two integrated displays [14]. The displays include the traffic display and
the RA display. The traffic display provides a consistent air picture of surrounding
aircraft that reply to interrogations. This provides an accurate air representation to
the pilots. The RA display activates when another aircraft enters its imminent threat
zone. In the imminent threat area, the intruding aircraft is a threat to the safety
Figure 4: TA and RA Displays: The left display is the TA display and the right is
the RA display [14].
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of the aircraft. The RA display aids the pilots by providing vertical speed or pitch
recommendations to avoid a mid-air collision. Figure 4 shows a TCAS traffic display
on the left and an RA display on the right. The TCAS traffic display shows several
different aircraft on the screen, with the red block displaying a threat to the aircraft.
The blue diamond on the screen represents another aircraft of no danger to the host
aircraft. The RA display on the right shows the red line indicating an RA is in place.
The aircraft maintains constant altitude; however, the recommendation is that the
aircraft climb between 1500 to 2000 feet per minute. This recommendation is evident
in the green section of the circle around the screen. The red block on the RA screen
shows an aircraft 5 nautical miles to the right of the aircraft and only 200 feet below
the aircraft, hence the recommendation to climb.
2.4 TCAS Warning Notifications
For horizontal collision detection, TCAS [15] uses the range threshold, TAU. It
determines when a TA or RA is mandatory. TCAS calculates TAU and compares it
to set values. TAU is an estimate of time-to-collision based on separation and closure
rate. For vertical collision detection, TCAS uses time to co-altitude (vertical TAU),
and vertical separation (ZTHR). The computation for vertical TAU is the vertical
separation divided by the vertical closure rate between the two aircraft. With the
altitude of both aircraft, vertical TAU, and the horizontal TAU, TCAS decides on
the issuance of a TA or RA. Issuance of a TA or RA occurs when one of the following
occurs:
• Exceed Horizontal TAU and ZTHR
• Exceed Horizontal TAU and Vertical TAU
• Exceed DMOD and ZTHR
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• Exceed DMOD and Vertical TAU
2.4.1 Traffic Advisory
TCAS issues a TA whenever an aircraft becomes a threat to the aircraft [14]. A
TA assists the pilot with visually locating the intruding aircraft and preparing the
pilot for a possible RA. Responses to TCAS interrogations contain altitude values.
TCAS determines range by the response time of the reply. With the altitude, range,
and TAU, the aircraft decides whether to issue an RA. Those values compare to the
TAU, DMOD, and ZHTR values in Table 1. The TA projects as a yellow dot on the
RA display, as shown in Figure 4. If an intruder reports his or her altitude incorrectly,
a vulnerability with Mode C, TCAS issues TAs due to horizontal closure only. TA is
the precursor to the issuance of an RA for an intruding aircraft. Table 1 displays the
thresholds for when a TA triggers. TAU is the same for horizontal and vertical limits
[16].
2.4.2 Resolution Advisory
Once TCAS classifies an aircraft as an intruder, it is interrogated on a set time
interval [11]. Using data from replies, the interrogating aircraft computes TAU and co-
altitude. TCAS compares them against the thresholds of TAU, DMOD, and ZHTR,
Table 1: TA Thresholds
Ownship Altitude SL TAU(seconds) DMOD(nmi) ZTHR(feet)
< 1000 2 20 0.3 800
1000-2350 3 25 0.33 800
2350-5000 4 30 0.48 800
5000-10000 5 40 0.75 800
10000-20000 6 45 1.0 800
20000-42000 7 48 1.3 800
> 42000 7 48 1.3 1200
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Table 2: RA Thresholds
Ownship Altitude SL TAU(seconds) DMOD(nmi) ZTHR(feet)
< 1000 2 N/A N/A N/A
1000-2350 3 15 0.2 600
2350-5000 4 20 0.35 600
5000-10000 5 25 0.55 600
10000-20000 6 30 0.8 600
20000-42000 7 35 1.1 700
> 42000 7 35 1.1 800
shown in Table 2. If the values exceed the thresholds, TCAS displays an RA notifica-
tion on the pilot’s TCAS screen. The TCAS display shows a red dot to represent an
intruding aircraft on the TCAS display. The additional RA display displays the cur-
rent altitude rate highlighted in red, as shown in Figure 4. The red dot also displays
on the RA screen. Additionally, if an aircraft does not report its altitude, an RA
cannot be generated for it. This presents a security concern, as the countermeasure
for the intruder aircraft shifts to the visual identification skills of the pilot.
Once an aircraft exceeds the thresholds for an RA issuance, as shown in Table 2,
it must resolve the RA. The TCAS computer unit is responsible for the generation
and resolution steps of RAs. The initial step of the computer unit determines if the
aircraft needs to ascend or descend based on the range and altitude of the intruding
aircraft. The host aircraft then determines its flight path. The necessity for the
altitude in this step is why non-altitude reporting aircraft cannot trigger an RA. The
second step of the issuance process is the computer unit determining the strength of
the RA. RA strength refers to whether the host aircraft needs a flight path bound by
a vertical speed limit or an increase in the magnitude of the altitude rate. A vertical
speed limit is a reduction in the rate of climb, and in many cases, leads to the aircraft
leveling off. A magnitude increase is when TCAS recommends the aircraft to climb
in altitude by a certain rate. TCAS uses TAU and DMOD for horizontal alerts.
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III. Threat Actor and Attack Taxonomy
3.1 Threat Actor Model and Analysis
To understand TCAS threats, an individual must understand possible adversaries.
At the time of this thesis research, there were no published threat actor analyses for
TCAS. A model used to classify cyber threat actors against the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) protocol is the baseline for this model’s develop-
ment [17]. Also, two additional resources focused on air communication attacks,
provide insight into developing the threat actors [18, 19].
This model categorizes threat actors based on their end-state goal, skill-set, and
overall risk to the TCAS system. The following sections discuss the requirements for
each category.
3.1.1 End-State Goals
End-State Goals refer to the desired end-state by a threat actor. Many models
classify them based on their specific goal; however, this model focuses on the risk of
their end-state goal. The end-state model classifications include high-risk, medium-
risk, and low-risk. The details are listed below:
• High-Risk: An end-state goal classifies as high-risk if the goal is to deny, disrupt,
degrade, or destroy a TCAS system. High-risk end-state goals are permanent
solutions.
• Medium-Risk: An end-state goal classifies as medium-risk if the goal is to deny,
disrupt, or degrade a TCAS system. Medium-risk end-state goals are temporary
solutions until the threat actor meets the set goal.
18
• Low-Risk: An end-state goal classifies as low-risk if the actor has no intention
to deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy a TCAS system.
3.1.2 Skill-sets
Skill-sets refer to the technical capabilities of threat actors. The skill-set model
classifications are high ability, medium ability, and low ability. The details are listed
below:
• High Ability: A skill-set would classify as high ability if the actor can deny,
disrupt, degrade, or destroy a TCAS system. A high ability skill-set can act
from the air or ground. Also, a high ability skill set can cause persistent negative
effects against the system.
• Medium Ability: A skill-set would classify as medium ability if the actor can
deny, disrupt, or degrade a TCAS system. A medium ability skill-set can act
from the ground. Also, a medium ability skill set can cause non-permanent
negative effects against the system.
• Low Ability: A skill-set would classify as low ability if the actor cannot deny,
disrupt, degrade, or destroy a TCAS system. A low ability skill-set only acts
from the ground.
3.1.3 Overall Risk
Overall risk refers to true risk to the TCAS system, based on the skill-set and
end-state goal. If the skill-set and end-state goals are both high, the overall risk is
high. If either the skill-set or end-state goal is medium, the overall risk is medium. If
either the skill-set or end-state goal is low, the overall risk is low.
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3.1.4 Determined Threat Actors
The common adversaries associated with cyber-attacks are known as script kid-
dies, hacktivists, insider threats, organized crime, and advanced persistent threats
[17]. Since TCAS is a communication system, those adversaries are a starting base-
line for threat actors against TCAS. With further reduction, the list narrows to
advanced persistent threat (APT), insider threats, criminal organizations, and script
kiddies. Hacktivists do not fit the criteria for an possible threats against a safety
critical system. Script kiddies are individuals with interest but no expertise in the
area of cyber-attacks. Within the air communication community, the equivalent of
script kiddies is hobbyists. Hobbyists replace script kiddies in this threat actor model.
Figure 5 shows the classifications of each threat actor. The main column is the overall
risk. It relays the true risk of an actor to the communication integrity of TCAS and
Mode S. Subsequent sections provide further detail on each actor category.
3.1.4.1 Hobbyists
Hobbyists, similar to script kiddies, are individuals that have a genuine inter-
est in the topic, specifically TCAS. This includes individuals that own a software-
defined radio and track aircraft from their homes. Also, this includes universities
that study Mode S aircraft communication. Most hobbyists complete their tasks
from the ground. The threat posed by hobbyists is minimal to the safety of the air-
craft; however, the intelligence provided by hobbyists provides intelligence to both
criminal organizations and advanced persistent threats.
Hobbyists post gathered data on social media or input it to the ADS-B/TCAS
tracking sites available online. A report released by BuzzFeed in August 2017 demon-
strates this government intelligence risk. The report released flight tracks for certain
military aircraft after individuals used ADS-B Exchange paired with a basic artifi-
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Actor End-State Goal Skill-Set Overall Risk
Advanced Persistent Threats High Risk High Ability High
Insider Threat High Risk Medium Ability Medium
Criminal Organizations Medium Risk Medium Ability Medium
Hobbyists Low Risk Low Ability Low
Figure 5: TCAS Threat Actor Model Results: A color-coded representation of end-
state goals, skill-sets, and overall risks for each threat actor.
cial intelligence algorithm to discover military and government operations [20]. This
demonstrates the impact that a software-defined radio (SDR) and/or access to a site
with ADS-B/TCAS information offers. The data impacts operations and the safety
of government and commercial. For this, hobbyists are TCAS threat actors; however,
they do not impact the overall capabilities of a TCAS system.
3.1.4.2 Insider Threats
A report into airport security notes that Transport Security Administration (TSA)
does not have adequate processes in place to guarantee the successful detection of an
insider threat. In the aviation domain, an insider threat is an employee that uses their
access privileges to exploit vulnerabilities with a goal of causing harm to aircraft or
customers of aircraft services [21].
Financial incentives are possible motivational factors for insider threats, specifi-
cally from other airlines. A near mid-air collision creates the possibility of distrust
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in a company’s ability to safely fly passengers. Additionally, emotions drive insider
threats due to negative events that have occurred within their organization. Even
though motivations differ, some insider threats have direct access to the onboard
TCAS system. If the insider threat is a pilot, they have direct control of the sys-
tem. Physical access to a system presents a threat actor with the ability to cause
considerable harm to the system. A potential possibility is a complete disable of
the system; however, any additional pilots are able to reactivate TCAS and/or the
Mode S transponder at any point. Since an insider threat cannot cause a permanent
disabling of the system, their overall skill-set is only medium-risk.
3.1.4.3 Criminal Organizations
The next level of threat actors is criminal organizations. Even though there are no
documented cases of criminal activity with TCAS-equipped aircraft, the risk is still
present, especially as the knowledge of TCAS and ADS-B spreads. Criminal organi-
zations typically focus on conducting operations that provide monetary gain. While
there are no direct monetary gains in affecting TCAS systems, there are secondary
effects. A secondary effect represents a consequence, positive or negative, from a
primary mission or conducted operation. For instance, if a criminal organization can
disrupt the air picture of an air traffic control tower or of an aircraft charged with
tracking illegal aircraft, a criminal organization could bypass security checkpoints.
Bypassing security checks allows the ability to transport any items without fear of
discovery. This is just an example scenario; however, the ability and the incentive
are there for criminal organizations. For this reason, they are a medium risk to the
TCAS system.
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3.1.4.4 Advanced Persistent Threats
APT is an overarching term for several groups that severely impacts the integrity
and operational capability of TCAS. There are several sub-groups within the advanced
persistent threat group. These groups’ capabilities include disabling or destroying
TCAS from both the ground and air. These sub-groups include nation-state mili-
taries, state-sponsored groups, and terrorist organizations. The below list discusses
these sub-groups in more detail.
• Nation-State Militaries: Nation-state militaries are militaries associated with
different countries. These militaries equip themselves with technology that af-
fords direct interaction with aircraft systems, including TCAS. The militaries
have the capability to interact with aircraft on the ground and in the air. This
sub-group poses the biggest risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) of the TCAS system.
• State-Sponsored Groups: State-sponsored groups receive monetary support from
a country’s government; however, they are not directly associated with the gov-
ernment or military of the country. They are similar to nation-state militaries
in their overall capabilities. The difference is that state-sponsored groups are
limited to air operations within their host nation. This diminishes the capabil-
ity to affect TCAS systems in an air-to-air environment unless the airspace is
within their nation.
• Terrorist Organizations: Terrorist organizations are groups that conduct op-
erations due to their religious or cultural beliefs. The objectives of terrorist
organizations range from scare tactics to causing harm to citizens of other op-
posing nations or groups. The capabilities are similar to that of nation-state
militaries; however, the tactics are less sophisticated. These organizations do
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not typically have air-to-air access to other TCAS-equipped aircraft; however,
it is still possible and requires consideration.
3.2 TCAS Threat Taxonomy Based on Threat Actor Model Results
With the potential threat actors, a taxonomy of threats for the TCAS system
becomes plausible. Thorough research of the technical specifications in [11] and re-
search of various other attack taxonomies against Mode S communication systems
offer the determination of possible threats and attacks against TCAS. The presented
attacks are only plausible from the threat actors in Section III. The main component
focus of this section is on the Mode S transponder, TCAS control panel, and TCAS
computer unit. Any impact on the two devices will impact the entire TCAS system.
Since ADS-B uses Mode S, the attack model from [22] assists in the development
of possible threats. The attack categories are passive and active attacks. A passive
attack is an attack that does not require physical access or the ability to generate
interrogations or replies. Active attacks require the threat actor to generate interro-
gations, replies, or physically interact with the system. There is one passive attack:
eavesdropping, and three active attacks: ghosting, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and false
injection.
3.2.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping describes passively listening and collecting aircraft Mode S traffic.
Since Mode S messages are unencrypted, their content is open to anyone. A threat ac-
tor would setup an SDR with an antenna and collect UF-11 TCAS all-call broadcasts.
These messages will have the ICAO address of the aircraft, as well as the altitude
and range. This information within these messages is easily logged and tracked. Pub-
licly available sites contain information about the ICAO address. This information
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can include the owners of the aircraft, including military affiliations. Gathering this
information is an intelligence-gathering activity.
Eavesdropping provides threat actors with insight into daily activities and sched-
ules. The unencrypted nature allows any individual or organization to passively listen
to broadcast air traffic. Eavesdropping is the one passive attack possible against a
TCAS system.
3.2.2 Ghosting
Ghosting is when an actual aircraft is not visible on TCAS displays to other
aircraft. To accomplish this attack, an individual needs physical access to the TCAS
control panel. This is considered an active attack against a TCAS system since it
requires physical interaction. The most likely threat actor in this scenario is an insider
threat.
If a pilot becomes an insider threat, this attack becomes plausible. Once air-
borne, a pilot can place TCAS in stand-by. An aircraft in stand-by replies only to
discrete interrogations. Other interrogations from surrounding aircraft do not receive
a response. Pilots also can disable the Mode S and Mode C transponders onboard
[23]. Without active transponders, TCAS cannot issue or complete interrogations or
replies. Without interrogations or replies, TCAS cannot advise TAs or RAs to other
pilots.
The inability to receive or transmit TAs or RAs has a grave impact on air safety.
An aircraft is much more likely to encounter a mid-air collision without an alert. This
applies to the ghosting aircraft and any surrounding aircraft.
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3.2.3 Denial-of-Service
In networking terminology, a DoS is an event that denies, degrades, or destroys
the ability for a device or organization to communicate with other devices. This
same principle applies to transponder communications between aircraft. Jamming is
an implementation of DoS attacks.
Jamming is an electronic warfare attack capability that focuses on interrupting a
signal at specific or multiple frequencies. Jamming creates a denial-of-service attack
against radar systems. Once a signal is interrupted, the aircraft cannot correctly pro-
cess signals. For TCAS, the 1090 MHz is the focus as it is the frequency for TCAS
replies. The attacks jam the receivers of the intended targets, so they are prevented
from recognizing and interpreting legitimate TCAS responses. With the advancement
of technology, low-cost SDRs offer the ability to perform jamming techniques. Jam-
ming offers multiple variations; however, the focus in on spot jamming and deceptive
jamming [24].
Spot jamming occurs when a jammer focuses all its power on one particular fre-
quency. A ground-based threat actor equipped with an SDR and an antenna offers
an example spot-jamming scenario. The antenna has enough power to reach at least
35,000 feet and overpower the originating transponder’s signal power. The antenna
would need to reach 35,000 feet since most aircraft cruise between 31,000 and 38,000
feet [25]. In this scenario, an aircraft sends a TCAS interrogation to an aircraft at
1030 MHz. After a three microsecond delay, the interrogated aircraft replies at the
1090 MHz. Once the threat actor discovers the aircraft, they begin broadcasting gar-
bled information at the 1090 MHz frequency. The antenna uses the highest amount
of power to overcome the power of the Mode S transponder on the replying aircraft.
Deceptive jamming, similar to spoofing, senses incoming radar signals, alters the
data within the signal, and then broadcasts them [24]. Range, azimuth, velocity, and
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an establishment of an RA or TA are alterable fields. A threat actor captures a reply
from the interrogated aircraft and then alters the contents. Once an aircraft is within
the TA range, the threat actor has less than 40 seconds to broadcast the altered reply.
Once the threat actor broadcasts the altered reply, the TCAS computer unit cannot
distinguish between the correct reply and the false reply.
In these jamming schemes, the threat actor denies the aircraft from receiving valid
replies, preventing TCAS from triggering an RA or TA. Also, the pilot is not alerted
to malicious activity and continues to trust TCAS. The lack of integrity of the air
picture along with the inadequate situational awareness of the pilot increases the
chance of a mid-air collision.
This attack is plausible by any of the proposed threat actors except insider threats
with the purchase of a basic SDR and antenna. Criminal organizations and advanced
persistent threats can purchase more advanced equipment and further disrupt an
aircraft from sending and receiving Mode S transponder signals.
3.2.4 False Injection
False injection is disguising communication from an untrusted source as commu-
nication from a trusted entity [26]. False injection allows an actor to inject aircraft
into a target’s air picture. The following section details the requirements for a false
injection attack against a TCAS system. The requirements divide into 3 phases:
Acquire, Emulate, and Trigger.
3.2.4.1 Acquire
The first step of false injection requires a threat actor to determine the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) addresses of the surrounding aircraft.
The ICAO address is the identification alphanumeric for each aircraft. A threat actor
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could use a UF-11 message to interrogate all nearby aircraft [4]. In the DF-11 replies,
the aircraft reports the ICAO address, altitude information, and range. Additionally,
a threat actor could listen for UF-11 all-call interrogations from other aircraft. Those
all-call messages contain the IC of the Mode S transponder and the ICAO address of
the aircraft. Knowing the ICAO address of the target, the threat actor will choose
a lower ICAO address. A lower ICAO address refers to an ICAO address that is
numerically or alphabetically first between the two aircraft. The aircraft with the
lower ICAO address takes priority during TA or RA maneuver selection.
3.2.4.2 Emulate
The threat actor inserts the chosen ICAO address into the AP field of a DF-11
reply to the target aircraft’s UF-11 all call. Additionally, they insert the necessary
altitude in the DF-11 reply. Both aircraft determine the range between the aircraft
by the round-trip travel time (RTT) of an interrogation and a reply. After the first
DF-11 reply, the target aircraft specifically interrogates the false aircraft by ICAO
address. Over an average of 3 messages, the false aircraft must maintain an altitude
and a range that meets the TAU, DMOD, and ZTHR requirements. The threat actor
falsely injects the altitude into the DF-11 reply. The range requirement is satisfied by
the threat actor making the RTT shorter between interrogation and reply messages.
The threat actor then replies to the TCAS interrogation within three microseconds. If
the false reply altitude, range, or timing requirements are not met, the TCAS system
discards the spoofed aircraft.
3.2.4.3 Trigger
If the threat actor satisfies the altitude and range requirements, they can trigger
an RA on the target aircraft with a resolution advisory complement (RAC). UF-16
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messages contain the RAC field. The target aircraft will then register an RA alert on
its TCAS screen for a spoofed aircraft. To continue the presence of an RA alert, the
threat actor must send a UF-16 message at least every 3 seconds with the RAC field
set [4].
A representation of false injection is shown in Figure 6. In this scenario, the at-
tacker has already satisfied the altitude and range requirements for the target aircraft.
At this point, the spoofed aircraft is sending a UF-16 with the RAC field set. This
triggers an RA alert on the target aircraft, resulting in a successful attack.
This type of attack diminishes the integrity of the air picture. In an extreme
scenario, the flight path of an aircraft alters. This type of attack is feasible by any of
the three threat actors discussed. The most likely actor to accomplish due to need is









Passive (No Aircraft 
Effect)
Pilot Distrust Possible Mid-Air Collision
Eavesdropping False Injection Denial-of-Service Ghosting
Figure 7: Formalized Threat Tree: Representation of Threats and Possible Outcomes.
3.2.5 Formalized Threat Tree
The determined attacks allow the creation of a formalized threat tree to under-
stand the plausible effects on TCAS. Figure 7 illustrates the formalized threat tree.
There are three outcomes considered from the attacks: passive, pilot distrust, and a
possible mid-air collision. The threat tree notes that false injection has pilot distrust
and a mid-air collision as possible outcomes. It is the only noted attack with two
possible outcomes.
3.2.6 Chart Discussion
Figure 8 illustrates the threat actors’ capabilities to perform the taxonomy of
TCAS threats. Consistent with the high overall risk, APT’s capabilities allow com-
pletion of all 4 discussed attacks due to their high overall skill-set. Insider threats’
capabilities only allow the performance of 2 of the attacks. The attack surface and
skill-set of insider threats is only physical aircraft access. Criminal organizations’
capabilities allow the performance of 3 of the 4 attacks, with ghosting being the ex-
ception. Usually, criminal organizations do not have physical access to the TCAS
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Eavesdropping X X X X
Active
Ghosting X X
Denial of Service X X
False Injection X X
Figure 8: TCAS Taxonomy of Threats with Threat Actors: Representation of attacks
with possible threat actors.
system of an aircraft. Lastly, hobbyists only have the skill-set to passively eavesdrop.
The chart highlights the true risk to a TCAS system, and that is an APT followed
by insider threats and criminal organizations.
3.3 Current Research
Much of the current research in aviation security focuses on ADS-B security. ADS-
B uses Mode S interrogations, replies, and broadcasts [27]. Location data is constantly
broadcast by ADS-B, offering tracking capabilities for individuals. Several threat tax-
onomies exist for ADS-B communications and its message formats. TCAS security
is a newly developing aviation arena. There are brief mentions regarding potential
security issues for TCAS in several papers focused on ADS-B security. Only two
organizations published security-focused research on TCAS. They are a thesis com-
pleted by students at Virginia Tech and research papers from individuals associated
with Open Sky Network. The research is on a threat overview for the next generation
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TCAS system, ACAS X, and TCAS false injection.
3.3.1 ACAS X Threat Overview
Prior research explored possible vulnerabilities for the next generation collision
avoidance system, ACAS X [28]. The paper discusses a simulation that analyzes
ADS-B data for aircraft tracks that fit the criteria needed for triggering a false RA.
The simulation focuses on altitude and the range components of an RA. The paper
did not discuss the requirements in detail. That research did not address timing
requirements in detail, and it assumed the satisfaction of timing requirements and
bearing constraints. Additionally, the research focused on past flights rather than an
overall flight risk profile.
3.3.2 False Injection Aircraft on TCAS
In [4], the focus is on falsely injecting an aircraft onto another aircraft. Specifically,
the main focus is creating DF-0 replies that include all of the required information.
The author creates the messages using the publicly available format for DF-0 mes-
sages. The experiment includes GNURadio and SDR for message development and
transmission. There are many different assumptions made with the simulation:
• Timing: The simulation assumes an attacker accurately decreases the round
trip travel time of replies.
• Range Test: The simulation assumes an attacker satisfies the range test require-
ments to trigger an RA.
• Bearing Constraints: The simulation assumes the relative aircraft bearing is 0
degrees. The spoofed aircraft and the actual aircraft are facing each other. The
author does not explore bearing constraints.
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• Stationary Aircraft: The simulation assumes the two aircraft remain stationary
during communication.
The simulation is successful in creating DF-0 replies. The next section presents a
simulation created to determine the range and bearing constraints. Additionally, the
simulation presents timing details of Mode S that allow an attacker to successfully
time responses.
3.3.3 Key Vulnerability Takeaways
The key takeaway from the vulnerability analysis is that various impacts of a false
injection attack. The false injection attack is the only attack capable of causing pilot
distrust and possibly creating a mid-air collision. This dual risk paired with the previ-
ous development of Mode S TCAS communications by [4] warrants an understanding
of the requirements for a successful false injection and its probability of success.
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IV. Viability of False Injection
The possibility of a mid-air collision and/or pilot distrust merit further investi-
gation into a false injection attack. Additionally, the assumptions from the previous
study on false injection require investigation to determine the true plausibility of such
an attack.
The following chapter presents the methodology and completion of a simulation
testing the viability of a false injection attack. The chapter presents the findings
for the question: What are the requirements to satisfy the range test, altitude test,
and bearing constraints of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)? Addition-
ally, this chapter along with the subsequent results chapter answers the question:
What conditions allow a ground-based adversary to appropriately time responses and
falsely-inject a realistic aircraft into a target aircraft’s TCAS, eventually triggering
an RA?
The scenario for the simulation is a ground-based adversary paired with SDR type
technology, antenna, and other equipment targeting an operation aircraft in the sky.
The adversary sends created messages to the targeted aircraft, allowing the insertion
of a false aircraft into the air picture. The simulation uses different angle approaches,
speeds, distances, and altitudes.
The key players of note in the simulation are:
• Attacker: An individual on the ground with equipment capable of creating,
receiving, and sending Mode S messages.
• Target Aircraft: The aircraft that the attacker targets with the created Mode
S messages.




MATLAB R2019a offers matrix-based mathematics and real-time graphing capa-
bilities [29]. The simulation occurs within MATLAB. MATLAB provides accurate
mathematics results regarding necessary timing and positioning. All necessary code
implementation transpires within the MATLAB framework. The coding framework
begins with the first interrogation and then steps through each subsequent interroga-
tion and reply, while measuring distance, bearing, and required timing of interroga-
tions and replies.
4.2 Assumptions
To conduct the simulation within a reasonable environment and time, the simu-
lation has assumptions. The assumptions include a flat earth, stable terrain/weather
conditions, precise Mode-S timing, known aircraft characteristics, and attacker equip-
ment.
4.2.1 Flat Earth
For this model and simulation, the flat-earth model for distance is appropriate;
instead of using latitude and longitude, the distance and altitude are converted to
x,y,z coordinates. The minimum altitude considered during simulation is 25,000 feet.
The altitude of the ground attacker is 10 feet for this measurement. The program
uses the following equation to measure the line-of-sight for an object on the ground













The calculated line-of-sight is 228.218 miles. The farthest range implemented in the
simulation is 30 miles, 13 percent of the line-of-sight visibility. The implication is
that a flat-earth model is valid for distances ≤ 30 miles.
Additionally, ADS-B messages from a target aircraft provide the ground attacker
with its latitude and longitude [27]. ADS-B messages continually broadcast and con-
tain latitude, longitude, altitude, and bearing information. These messages provide
the attacker with another method to determine an accurate range to translate to
(x, y, z) coordinates.
Lastly, the ground attacker measures the range of the target aircraft by the time
between consecutive interrogations. This measurement provides an accurate distance
for the aircraft. The range measurement and bearing provide (x, y, z) coordinates for
the target aircraft.
4.2.2 Terrain and Weather
For the simulation, the terrain and weather are clear and do not have an impact.
Mountainous terrain presents challenges to accurately timing replies due to the re-
flection and/or blocking of signals. Additionally, adverse weather limits the visual
identification range of pilots. To determine the non-existence of a falsely-injected air-
craft and create pilot distrust, the pilot requires clear visibility for identification. For
this reason, the simulation assumes open skies, clear weather, and no terrain issues.
4.2.3 Mode S Interrogation and Reply Timing
Mode S replies to interrogations 128 microseconds after the phase sync reversal
of the interrogation [30]. Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) mandates a
maximum of 0.1 microsecond jitter. There is not a published study on the accuracy
of the interrogation and reply timing. Without a scientific study on the subject,
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the simulation uses the TCAS technical mandate of once per second for TAU ≤ 60
and every 5 seconds when TAU > 60 and the Mode S mandate of 128 microseconds
between the interrogation phase sync reversal and the rising edge of the reply is used
and considered accurate. Additionally, TCAS has a jitter of up to ± 10 % on the 1
and 5 second interrogation timing
4.2.4 Aircraft Speed and Altitude
The simulation includes two aircraft, the target and spoofed aircraft. Both sim-
ulated aircraft are the Boeing 737 (B737). The simulated aircraft speed models the
cruising speed of the B737. The program assumes that the simulated aircraft maintain
cruising speed plus or minus 10 feet per second. Additionally, the program assumes
that the aircraft maintain their current cruising altitude plus or minus 700 feet from
one interrogation to the next.
4.2.5 Antenna and Transmitter Requirements
TCAS has specific requirements to accept a reply from a responding aircraft. The
power profile for TCAS is listed in Table 3 [11, 31].
With the listed parameters, the program assumes the ground station attacker has
an antenna with enough power and gain to meet the sensitivity requirements listed
of TCAS.
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Table 3: TCAS Power Profile
Parameter Value
Maximum Power 52 dBm
Minimum Power 32 dBm
Sensitivity -74 dBm
Cable Loss 0 dB
Maximum Antenna Gain 7.5 dBi
Minimum Antenna Gain 0 dBi
4.3 Aircraft Parameters
There are two simulated B737 aircraft. The following two sections discuss the
specific parameters and characteristics of each aircraft within the simulation. The
sections discuss the cruising speed, cruising altitude, and turning radius of the aircraft.
4.3.1 Target Aircraft
The target aircraft, the victim of the false injection attack, is the B737-800. The
B737-800 is the most widely used version of the B737, with over 4000 in active use
[32]. Other current versions of the B737 have very similar characteristics. For this
simulation, the B737-800 accurately depicts any of the new B737 aircraft from 600 to
900.
4.3.1.1 Aircraft Speed and Altitude
Boeing lists the cruise speed of the B737-800 at 0.789 mach [32]. Equivalently, it
is 887.88 feet per second. To ensure variability in aircraft speed from one simulation
to the next, the aircraft speed varies plus or minus 10 feet per second.
Additionally, the cruising altitude of the B737-800 is listed at 35,000 feet [32]. This
altitude varies based on time of flight, surrounding aircraft, and other characteristics.
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4.3.1.2 Turning Capability
The simulated aircraft turns left or right to alter course during the simulation.
The speed of the aircraft and the bank angle determines how many degrees the aircraft
turns, left or right, in one second. The maximum bank angle without putting the
passenger’s safety at risk is 25 degrees [33]. With the cruising speed and bank angle
known, the standard rate of turn is below:





Rate of Turn =
1091 ∗ tan(Bank Angle)
V elocity
= .97 degrees per second
(2)
1091 is a constant used in the standard rate of turn equation. Using the calculated
standard rate of turn, the program allows the target aircraft to turn left or right 1
degree every second. Conversely, the program allows the aircraft to maintain its
current bearing and projected path rather than turning left or right.
4.3.2 Spoofed Aircraft
Spoofed aircraft refers to a non-existent aircraft whose location and movement
over time signals a collision with the target. The spoofed aircraft has the same
capabilities as the target aircraft. The spoofed aircraft mirrors the altitude of the
target. Interrogations and ADS-B squitters report altitude. The speed of the spoofed
aircraft mirrors that of the target aircraft’s speed range. The program is adaptable
to other aircraft.
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4.4 Aircraft Tracking and Movement
The program uses a 4 quadrant x, y, and z, where z is always greater than or
equal to 0. There are also times the program evaluates on a 4 quadrant x and y plane.
During the simulations, the target aircraft and spoofed aircraft require their positions
to be consistently updated. The program simulates this by using the reported and
measured bearings, as well as the speed of the target and spoofed aircraft.
4.4.1 Target Aircraft Positioning, Tracking, and Movement Specifics
The target aircraft starts a certain range from the ground station. As noted in
the assumptions, the ground station already knows the target aircraft location due to
ADS-B squitters. Further ADS-B squitters give updates to the location and bearing of
the target aircraft. For position updating, the program uses the following equations:
X = current X + (V elo ∗∆t ∗ sin(bearing))
Y = current X + (V elo ∗∆t ∗ cos(bearing))
Z = reportedaltitude
(3)
This updates the (x, y, z) of the aircraft. The altitude adjusts by the change in the
reported altitude. The reported altitude remains within plus or minus 700 feet of the
originally reported altitude.
4.4.1.1 Relative Bearing Determination
The target aircraft determines the bearing by measuring the angle of arrival of
the reply. The angle of arrival measures the horizontal angle and has no vertical
component. The reply always comes from the same point, as the ground attacker
remains stationary. The most direct point from the ground to the target aircraft
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is the angle of arrival for the replies. The program uses the following equation to































4.4.2 Spoofed Aircraft Positioning, Tracking, and Movement Specifics
The spoofed aircraft positioning updates its position in the program using the
same equations as the target aircraft. The first step of the spoofed aircraft is in-
sertion into the air picture. Following insertion, the target aircraft measures the
new range/position of the spoofed aircraft based on the interrogation reply timing
[11, 34]. Additionally, the target aircraft measures and knows the bearing of the
spoofed aircraft based on the angle of arrival of reply.
4.4.2.1 Spoofed Aircraft Insertion
When the ground station sends the first reply, the spoofed aircraft inserts into the
air picture of the target aircraft. The spoofed aircraft has the same reported altitude
as the target aircraft. Since the spoofed aircraft is placed at the target aircraft’s
altitude, the additional distance from the ground station to the target aircraft adds
to the x and y positioning of the inserted aircraft. The position updates based on
the 4 quadrant x and y plane, using the algorithm 1. x1 and y1 are the x and y
coordinates of the target aircraft. x2 and y2 are the coordinates of ground station,
(0,0) respectively. Bearing represents the projected bearing of the spoofed aircraft.
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The relative bearing of the ground station to the target aircraft determines the bear-
ing. The distanceDifference is the distance from the ground station to the target
aircraft minus the distance between the target aircraft and an object at the same




(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2 + (z2 − z1)2
DGtoT−SameAlt =
√
(x2 − x1)2 + (y2 − y1)2
distanceDifference = DGtoT −DGtoT−SameAlt
(6)
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Algorithm 1 Spoofed Aircraft Insertion
1: function modifiedPosition(x1, y1, x2, y2, bearing, distanceDifference)
2: bearingMod = mod(bearing, 90)
3: if x1 > 0 and y1 > 0 then
4: x = x2 − distanceDifference ∗ sin(bearing)
5: y = y2 − distanceDifference ∗ cos(bearing)
6: else if x1 > 0 and y1 < 0 then
7: x = x2 − distanceDifference ∗ sin(bearing)
8: y = y2 + distanceDifference ∗ cos(bearing)
9: else if x1 < 0 and y1 > 0 then
10: x = x2 + distanceDifference ∗ sin(bearing)
11: y = y2 − distanceDifference ∗ cos(bearing)
12: else if x1 < 0 and y1 < 0 then
13: x = x2 + distanceDifference ∗ sin(bearing)
14: y = y2 + distanceDifference ∗ cos(bearing)
15: else if x1 = 0 and y1 > 0 then
16: y = y2 − distanceDifference
17: else if x1 = 0 and y1 < 0 then
18: y = y2 + distanceDifference
19: else if x1 > 0 and y1 = 0 then
20: x = x2 − distanceDifference
21: else if x1 < 0 and y1 = 0 then
22: x = x2 + distanceDifference
23: else
24: Target Aircraft is Overhead
25: end if
26: end function
4.5 Implementation of Required Tests
The following section discusses the implementation of the required tests and lim-
itation checks that occur during the receipt and processing of an interrogation reply.
The section discusses the tests and limitations in order of processing. The tests in-
clude the received signal power test, the range test, and the altitude test. The bearing
constraint check occurs after three received replies. To trigger an RA, these must be
satisfied.
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4.5.1 Received Signal Power Test
TCAS requires a received signal strength of greater than -74 dBm or -74 milliwatts
to accept and process an interrogation reply [31]. The simulation assumes the attacker
has an antenna and equipment with enough power and gain to meet the minimum
requirement. The TCAS minimum antenna gain is 0 dBi. If the gain is not 0 dBi,
TCAS adjusts the required received signal strength by adding or subtract the gain
from the -74 dBm requirement. The power and gain chosen for the attacker are
50 dBm and 5 dBi, respectively. The maximum range considered is 30 miles. The
altitude difference between the target aircraft and the ground station maximum is
45,000 feet. The maximum range and maximum altitude give a maximum distance of
31.1871 miles. When determining the minimum power received by the target aircraft,
the program uses the maximum distance. The program uses the Friis equation [35]
to determine the power received by the attacker and if that power meets the specified
requirement of -74 dBm. The Friis equation implemented is below with all values in
decibels:
RxP = TxP + TxG +RxG − FSPL (7)
RxP is receive power and TxP is the transmit power. TxG is the transmit gain and
RxG is the receiver gain. FSPL is the free-space path loss. Free space path loss is the
amount that a signal disperses over the length of distance that it travels [36]. The
equation for free space path loss is:
FSPL = 20 ∗ log10
(





R is the range or distance between the antennas. λ is the wavelength of the signal.
The reply sends at 1090 MHz. Wavelength is the speed of light (c) divided by the
frequency of the signal in hertz. The FSPL equation further expands to the equation
below:
FSPL = 20 ∗ log10
(




Using the frequency and furthest distance in the simulation, the FSPL is:
FSPL = 20 ∗ log10
(





With the path loss known, RxP is below.
RxP = TxP + TxG +RxG − FSPL
= 50 + 5 + 0− 127.2
= −72.2 dBm
(11)
The lowest power that is received is -72.2 dBm. It is higher than the required sensi-
tivity of -74 dBm. These settings always satisfy the received power test, so this test
is complete.
4.5.2 Bearing Constraints
The bearing error constraint of TCAS is plus or minus 10 degrees from the esti-
mated bearing [11, 37]. If a bearing measurement exceeds the bearing error constraint,
the track possibly coasts or drops. TCAS takes the first three bearing readings and
averages them together. TCAS creates a projected path for the tracked aircraft by
using the bearing average.
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The program takes the first three bearing measurements and averages them to-
gether using the following equation:
Bearing Average =
1st Bearing + 2nd Bearing + 3rd Bearing
3
(12)
With the bearing average, the program establishes a projected path for the spoofed
aircraft. Since the spoofed aircraft signals come from the ground station, the spoofed
aircraft bearing changes from one reply to the next. If the bearing change exceeds the
projected bearing by more than plus or minus 5 degrees from the projected bearing,
the program terminates with an error. The simulation uses plus or minus 5 degrees,
rather than 10 degrees since TCAS’s bearing estimate has a standard deviation of
5 degrees [11]. Additionally, if the target aircraft turns left or right, the program
adds the bearing change to the bearing average. This accounts for the target aircraft
movements and the effect on the reported bearings from the spoofed aircraft.
4.5.3 Range Test
There are two requirements with the range test [11]. They are the TAU calculation
and the diverging requirement.
4.5.3.1 Diverging Requirement
To successfully satisfy the range test and not have the aircraft track potentially
dropped, the spoofed aircraft must not diverge from the target aircraft. The sim-
ulation program measures this requirement by calculating the range rate using the
equation below [38]:
Range Rate = Spoofed V elocity ∗ cos(θ1) + Target V elocity ∗ cos(θ2) (13)
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θ1 is the measured angle between the spoofed aircraft’s heading and the closing
vector between the spoofed aircraft and target aircraft. Since the spoofed aircraft’s
signal is coming from a stationary object with an omnidirectional antenna, the head-
ing and closing vectors are equivalent. Therefore, θ1 will remain 0 at all times. θ2
is the measured angle between the target aircraft’s heading and the closing vector
between the target aircraft and the spoofed aircraft. θ2 continuously changes from
each reply to the next. Figure 9 provides a visual for the scenario described above.
The calculation for θ2 is below:
Bearing Difference = |180− Target Heading + Spoofed Heading| (14)
𝜃2
Target Velocity Heading
No Angle Difference 
between Slant Range and 
Spoof Velocity Heading, so 
𝜃1 is 0.
Figure 9: Closing vector: A visual to show the angles between the spoofed and target
aircraft headings.
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With θ1 and θ2, the range rate equation is as follows:
Range Rate = Spoof V elo ∗ cos(0) + Target V elo ∗ cos
(|180− Target Heading + Spoofed AC Heading|)
= Spoof V elo+ Target V elo ∗ cos
(|180− Target Heading + SpoofAC Heading|)
(15)
The range rate calculation compares to 0. If the range rate is 0 or positive,
the program maintains the target and spoofed aircraft as converging. The target
aircraft continues to maintain the track of the spoofed aircraft since the aircraft
remain converging. Contrarily, if the range rate is negative, the aircraft are diverging
or separating. Diverging aircraft cannot have a RA reported [31]. Additionally, a
diverging aircraft track possibly drops from the target aircraft’s TCAS system.
4.5.3.2 TAU Calculation
As previously discussed, TAU is the measurement that determines when a TA or
RA is necessary from a horizontal aspect. TAU gives the number of seconds until
the impact or closest point of approach. The programs uses the following equation






r is the range between the target and the spoofed aircraft. SMOD is listed as a
“distance surveillance modifier,” and it is equivalent to 3 NMI [11]. Rdot is the range
rate. The denominator in the equation below determines the range rate. Using range
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Spoof V elo+ Target V elo ∗ cos(|180− Target Heading + Spoof Heading|)
(17)
The program compares the TAU calculation to the mandated TAU value of 35
seconds. If TAU is less than the 35 second threshold, the ground attacker successfully
meets the range requirement, allowing the trigger of an RA. If TAU is greater than
the 35 second threshold, the process of Uplink Format (UF) and Downlink Format
(DF) 0 interrogations and replies continue.
4.5.4 Altitude Test
The altitude test compares the altitude of the target aircraft and the spoofed
aircraft. If the altitude comparison has an altitude difference of less than or equal to
700 feet, the spoofed aircraft meets the altitude requirement for an RA.
The program copies the altitude of the target aircraft into the altitude field of the
spoofed aircraft reply. If the altitude changes from one interrogation to the next, the
altitude adjusts to match the target aircraft’s altitude. This ensures the altitude test
maintains a true and satisfied reading. With the altitude test always satisfied, the
attacker only needs to focus on the range test, power test, and bearing constraints.
4.6 TCAS Interrogations and Reply Timing Implementation
The program uses 2 TCAS interrogation and reply types: All-Call interrogations
and replies and Short TCAS interrogations and replies. Short TCAS interrogations
are the same as UF-0 interrogations and DF-0 replies. An all-call interrogation is the
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first interrogation received during the establishment of a track in the program. An
all-call reply follows the interrogation. All following communications are short TCAS
interrogations and replies.
4.6.1 All-Call Interrogations/Replies
The All-Call interrogation is the first interrogation received by the ground station
attacker. The program uses the speed of light to determine the arrival time of the
interrogation to the ground. The following equation represents the calculation of
arrival time:







D is the distance between the target and the ground station. c is the standard
speed that RF signals travel at, the speed of light. PulseT ime is the additional time
needed to send P1, P2, and the rest of P6. Figure 10 shows a Mode S interrogation











Figure 10: Mode S Interrogation Format: Layout and timing for Mode S interroga-
tions [30].
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The bits send during the P6 pulse. Additionally, the transmission rate for Mode S
interrogations is 4 Mbps [34]. Using those, the equation further reduces to:













Mode S requires systems to wait 128 microseconds from the phase sync reversal of
an interrogation until the rising edge of the replies first pulse [30]. There are 4.75
microseconds from the first pulse of the interrogation to the phase sync reversal of
the interrogation [30]. This gives a total of 132.75 microseconds from interrogation
received to first pulse of reply. Figure 11 illustrates the timing of a Mode S reply.
The ground station sends the all-call reply after the mandated 132.75 microsecond
data processing period. The reply arrives to the target aircraft using the following
equation:











𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 − 8 𝜇𝑠
3.5 𝜇𝑠
Figure 11: Mode S Reply Format: Layout and timing for Mode S replies [30].
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All-Call replies have 56 bits in the reply. The reply bit rate is 1 Mbps [11]. NewD
is the new distance since receiving the interrogation. c remains the speed of light.
Preamble is the time before the bits process. For replies, it is 8µs [30]. The reply
from ground station equation updates to:






= 196.75E − 6s+ New D
c
(21)
This formula gives the program the arrival time of the reply to the target aircraft.
4.6.2 Short TCAS Interrogations/Replies
Once the All-Call interrogation and reply complete, the simulation begins the
short TCAS interrogation and reply sequence. The equations from the all-call in-
terrogations remain implemented for short TCAS interrogation. The timing of short
TCAS interrogations depends on the TAU calculation of an interrogation reply. If
TAU is greater than 60, then TCAS and the program interrogates every 5 seconds. If
TAU is less than or equal to 60, then the program interrogates every 1 second. The jit-
ter is plus or minus 10 percent from the time values. Table 4 lists the program’s range
for short TCAS interrogation timing: All-Call and short TCAS interrogations/replies
have the same transmission rate and bit length. The most important simulation as-
pect of short TCAS interrogations/replies is the difference between the arrival of the
interrogation to the ground attacker and the spoofed aircraft location. Additionally,
Table 4: Jitter Timing Ranges
TAU Timing Jitter Timing Range
TAU > 60 5s ± 10% 4.5s-5.5s
TAU ≤ 60 1s ± 10% 0.9s-1.1s
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the time of reply from the ground station adjusts to account for the difference in loca-
tion of the ground station and spoofed aircraft. The 132 microsecond delay between
a received interrogation and expected reply allows the simulated attacker a window
to send the reply early. The equation below determines when the reply must send to
correctly position the spoofed aircraft:
Needed Reply T ime = ATG+ 0.00013275s− (Time Diff)− (DG/c) (22)
ATG is the arrival time to ground. Arrival time to ground is the time the interrogation
arrives at the ground station. 132.75µs is the delay between a Mode S interrogation
and reply. TimeDiff is the difference between when the interrogation arrives at the
ground and when it arrives at the spoofed aircraft location. DG is the distance the
spoofed aircraft gains during the interrogation travel time and the 132.75µs expected
delay. That is divided by the speed of light to determine the time added to the reply
time.
4.7 Program Details and Parameters
The program runs a set of 500 simulations with the same parameters. Testing
revealed the statistical difference was non-existent when using 1000 and 2000 simu-
lations from 500 simulations. After the set of 500 simulations completes, the starting
relative bearing from the target aircraft to the ground station changes. After 37 sets
with different starting bearings, the altitude, range, or altitude and range change. In
total, there are 92,500 simulations run at each range with different altitudes. There
are 111,000 simulations run at each altitude with differing ranges. The following
subsections discuss the details of the parameters
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4.7.1 Range
The starting range for the target aircraft changes throughout the sets of simula-
tions. The ranges used by the program are 30 miles, 25 miles, 20 miles, 15 miles, 10
miles, and 5 miles. 30 miles is the max range considered, as the maximum distance
of TCAS is 35 miles [40].
4.7.2 Altitude
The starting altitude for the target aircraft changes throughout the sets of sim-
ulations. The program uses altitudes of 45,000 feet, 40,000 feet, 35,000 feet, 30,000
feet, and 25,000 feet. This includes the most common cruising altitude of aircraft,
35,000 feet [32].
4.7.3 Starting Relative Bearing
The starting relative bearing of the target aircraft changes after each set of 500
simulations. The starting relative bearing from the target to the ground station starts
at 90 degrees. After each set of 500, it lowers by 5 degrees. Once at 0 degrees, it then
lowers to 355 degrees on the next set. The 5 degree decrease occurs 37 times and
ends at 270 degrees relative bearing. The range is [90-0] and [355-270]. This range
of relative bearings lies within the visual identification window of the pilot. This is
important to ensure the pilot maintains the capability to verify the spoofed aircraft
doesn’t exist. Algorithm 2 shows the process for conducting all trials.
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Algorithm 2 Program Simulations
1: altitude = 25, 000ft
2: range = 5m
3: while altitude ≤ 45, 000ft do
4: while range ≤ 30m do
5: while relativeBearing ≤ 90||relativeBearing ≥ 270 do
6: Run 500 simulations
7: relativeBearing = mod(relativeBearing − 5, 360)
8: end while
9: range = range+ 5m
10: relativeBearing = 90
11: end while
12: altitude = altitude+ 5000ft
13: range = 5m
14: end while
4.8 Validation and Verification
This section presents simulations that test the program’s capability to correctly
end tracking when tests or constraints are exceeded. Additionally, this section verifies
and validates the program’s ability to accurately track aircraft, update their position,
and measure the distance between them.
4.8.1 Positioning and Tracking
The program simulates with a starting distance of 30 miles and 45,000 feet. The
(x, y, z) coordinates are (112005.71414, 112005.71414, 45000). The exact starting po-
sition is arbitrary but produces the same value from other positions. The starting
bearing is 270 degrees. The initial reply arrives with the spoofed aircraft inserted
with a bearing of approximately 45 degrees, as expected. After a 5.416566 second
interrogation period, including jitter, the target aircraft turned left 1 degree. That
interrogation period is due to a TAU of greater than 60 and the time for the interro-
gation to arrive. The total time at this point is 5.417301 seconds. The aircraft spends
0.000735 seconds with a bearing of 270 and 5.416566 with a bearing of 269. With the
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Figure 12: Positioning and Tracking Verification: Printout from simulation detailing
timing and distance data.
original 0.000735s, mathematically, the position updates to:
x = 112005.71414 + (888ft/s ∗ 0.000735s ∗ sin(270))
= 112005.06146
y = 112005.71414 + (888ft/s ∗ 0.000735s ∗ cos(270))
= 112005.71414
(23)
Next, the 5.416566 seconds of a bearing of 269 degrees updates the position:
x = 112005.06146 + (888ft/s ∗ 5.416566s ∗ sin(269))
= 107195.8834
y = 112005.06146 + (888ft/s ∗ 5.416566s ∗ cos(269))
= 111921.7696
(24)
Using the new (x, y, z) coordinates the the distance between target aircraft and the
ground station is computed:
distance =
√
(107195.8834− 0)2 + (111921.7696− 0)2 + (45000− 100)2
= 161348 feet
(25)
The program code produced the same value, shown in Figure 12. This shows the
program accurately tracks and updates aircraft positioning based on speed, time,
and bearing.
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Figure 13: Bearing Constraint Failure: Printout from simulation showing bearing
failure when appropriate.
4.8.2 Bearing Constraint
The bearing constraint verification and validation test uses the same simulation
parameters from the positioning and tracking test. The program illustrates its ac-
curacy in tracking aircraft, updating position, and measuring bearing. The bearing
measurements are accurate. The verification and validation of the bearing constraint
ensures the program stops when a bearing reporting exceeds ± 5 degrees from the
average of the first three bearing reports. The first bearing is 44.9999 degrees. The
second bearing is 42.4739 degrees. The third bearing reporting is 39.8848. The aver-
age of the bearings is 42.4529. The next reported bearing is 37.05223. It exceeds the
bearing constraint of ± 5 degrees. As shown in Figure 13, the bearing exceeds the
constraint.
4.8.3 Range Test Failure
Using the same (x, y, z) as the previous simulations, the verification and validation
of the range test occurs. The bearing changes to 45 degrees, so the target aircraft
moves away from the ground station. The test sets the target aircraft speed greater
than the spoofed aircraft. After the third reply, the next reply must not have a range
rate of less than 10 ft/s. The target aircraft moves away at a faster rate than the
Figure 14: Diverging Simulation Failure: The code readout after two aircraft are
diverging.
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spoofed aircraft, so it is diverging. Figure 14 illustrates the program terminating due
to diverging aircraft.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Requirements for Success
This section presents the requirements for simulation success. Altitude is not
included as a requirement for success, as the attacker’s altitude reflects that of the
target. The spoofed aircraft maintains an altitude that successfully meets the altitude
test throughout each simulation.
5.1.1 Interrogation and Reply Requirements
Bearing and TAU measurements are necessary for false injection capabilities. For
bearing and TAU calculations to occur, Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
requires 3 rounds of interrogation and replies. Those 3 rounds provide a bearing
estimation for comparison. After 3 interrogation and reply rounds, with the next
interrogation and reply cycle, the target aircraft calculates the TAU and bearing for
RA determination. Thus, for success, the simulation must not fail on or before the
fourth interrogation cycle.
5.1.2 Range Requirements
The two success requirements of the range test in the simulation are the diverging
test and the TAU calculation. If at any point the spoofed aircraft and the target
aircraft have a range closure rate of less than 10 feet per second, the simulation
terminates. Additionally, the simulation is successful if TAU is less than 35 seconds.




The simulation is successful if the spoofed aircraft bearing change is less than 5
degrees from the projected bearing path. If a bearing change over 5 degrees occurs, the
simulation terminates. If TAU is not below 35 seconds when the termination occurs,
the simulation is not successful. Table 5 displays the truth table for simulation success
at the end of the simulation.
5.2 General Results and Analysis
As noted from the above subsections, whenever TAU (≤ 35s) is true, the simula-
tion is successful. This section discusses the initial results of the simulations including
flight paths and TAU averages.
5.2.1 Flight Paths
Flight paths differ from each simulation to the next. The flight path is randomly
chosen from one simulation to the next. The aircraft turn left, turn right, or maintain
close to their starting bearing from each simulation.
5.2.2 TAU Average
Each simulation calculates the final TAU value upon its termination. The program
writes the TAU value for each of the 500 simulations in a set. The average of the
ending TAU values is taken for each set and measured against the 35 second threshold.
The sets with an average TAU value less than or equal to 35 seconds is successful. The
overall success of the 555,000 trials is 32.6305%. For further analysis, the most useful
variables in displaying simulation success are range and starting relative bearing.
Figure 15 displays the TAU averages. The x-axis is the starting relative bearing
between the target aircraft and the ground station. Each set of 5 lines represents
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a different starting range. The different colors represent different altitudes at each
range. Table 6 discusses the altitude scheme for Figure 15. In Figure 15, the
horizontal black line indicates the TAU threshold of 35 seconds. Where an individual
line goes below the threshold indicates a starting relative bearing, altitude, and range
that successfully satisfies all required TCAS tests over 50 percent of the simulations.

































Figure 15: First-Look Tau Values: Each line represents a different range and altitude
pair. The lines represents the TAU value as relative bearing increases and decreases.
61
Most TAU values fall above the maximum 35 second TAU threshold, as evident by
the chart. TAU decreases and success increases as altitude and range lowers.
5.3 In-Depth Analysis
The previous section focused on a statistical average TAU calculation with a
hard comparison against the TAU limit. The following section looks at the in-depth
statistical values of each set of 500 simulations. The section overviews the skewness,
kurtosis, standard deviation, and percentage of success for each altitude, range, and
starting relative bearing combination.
5.3.1 Skewness
Skewness is the representation of the asymmetry within a data set [41]. A perfectly
symmetric data distribution, normally distributed, has a skewness value of 0. If
the skewness value is negative, the data distributes more to the left of the mean.
Additionally, the tail of the left side is longer than the right side. In contrast, if the
skewness value is positive, the data distributes more to the right of the mean and
the right tail is longer. Figure 16 provides a visual for negative, positive, and zero
value skewness distribution curves. West [42] set the skewness guidelines for normally








To accommodate for the sample size and provide better a understanding of the data
skewness, the equation is:
Skewness =
√











Figure 16: Positive, Negative, and Zero Skewness graphical representations [41].
Detailed analysis provides the skewness value for each set of 500 simulations. Figure
17 shows all skewness values with the thresholds of -2.1 and 2.1. There are 28 data
sets over the skewness limits.
5.3.2 Kurtosis
Kurtosis is the fourth sample moment about the mean, and regarding shape, it de-
scribes if data is heavy-tailed or light-tailed compared to an even normal distribution
[43]. A kurtosis value of greater than 3 represents leptokurtic data. This implies that
the distribution tails are heavy compared to normal distribution. A kurtosis value
of less than 3 represents playtkurtic data. This implies that the distribution tails
are thinner compared to a normal distribution curve. The kurtosis value for normal
distribution is 3 and known as mesokurtic. Figure 18 provides a visual for playtkur-
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Figure 17: Original Kurtosis and Skewness Values: Orange represents kurtosis values








In data that has occasional data outliers, excess kurtosis is the standard measure-
ment. The excess kurtosis value for normal distribution is 0 [44]. Leptokurtic is then
all positive values and playtkurtic is all negative values. Additionally, the analysis
accomodates for sample size, so the excess kurtosis equation is:
Kurtosis =
N(N + 1)






− 3(N − 1)
2






Figure 18: Visual Kurtosis Representations: Leptokurtic, Mesokurtic, and Platykur-
tic kurtosis graphical representations [43].
West [42] set the kurtosis guidelines for normally distributed data as 3 ± 4.1. That
range is for proper kurtosis. The range for excess kurtosis is 0 ± 4.1. The kurtosis
value for each set of 500 simulations is measured. Figure 17 shows all computed
kurtosis values and the normal distribution thresholds of -4.1 and 4.1. There are 42
simulations with kurtosis values that exceed the threshold. Those data sets require
manipulation.
5.3.3 Box Cox Transformation
Sets of data that have kurtosis or skewness values that exceed recommended
thresholds require transformation. [45] recommends using the Box-Cox transforma-
tion as it provides multiple transformation options for data, choosing the option that
best transforms your data from non-normal to normal distribution. [45] provides the
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equation used to transform each data point:




λ is determined by testing various values for λ in the equation with each data point
[45]. The λ value chosen is the one that provides the skewness and kurtosis values
closest to 0, as they are the most normally distributed. Different λ values provided
different transformations, such as λ = 0.5 gives the following transformation for each
value:








This is considered a square root transformation [45]; whereas, other λ values give
other types of transformations.
This Box-Cox transformation is applied to data sets of 500 that do not adhere to
the skewness and kurtosis values. After the Box-Cox transformation, all outlier data
sets transform to sets that meet normality considerations. Figure 19 is the new graph
with all transformed data sets.
5.3.4 Standard Deviation Analysis
Normally distributed data sets present probability analysis capabilities. The key
statistics used from each data set are the mean and standard deviation. Additionally,
the target TAU value is≤ 35 seconds. The following equation uses the mean, standard
















































    5HODWLYH%HDULQJ
Figure 19: Kurtosis and Skewness After Data Transformation: Orange represents
kurtosis values and green represents skewness values.
This Z-score represents the probability that TAU is ≤ 35 seconds. The equation is
further clarified to:
P (TAU ≤ 35) = 35− µ
σ
(33)
The Z-score calculated compares to a Z-table that list the appropriate probability for
the Z-score. They give an accurate depiction of successful false injection probabilities
from a certain distance, altitude, and relative bearing.
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5.3.5 Threat Map
The false injection probabilities allow the creation of an accurate threat map for
potential aircraft. The color and percentage legend for the threat maps is:
• Highly Possible (Probability of Success≥ 70%) - Red areas represent ranges
and relative bearings that false injection attacks are highly successful.
• Moderately Possible(40% ≥ Probability of Success < 70%) - Yellow areas rep-
resent ranges and relative bearings that false injection attacks are moderately
successful.
• Not Likely Possible (Probability of Success≤ 40%) - Green areas represent
ranges and relative bearings that false injection attacks are likely to be unsuc-
cessful.
Figures 20-24 represent the threat maps for aircraft. Each figure is a threat map for
each different simulated altitude. Aircraft that appear and maintain a track in green
areas of the threat map project as real aircraft. Conversely, aircraft that appear and
maintain a track within red areas cannot be validated as real or falsely injected until
visual identification occurs.
The figures provide pilots with an accurate understanding of the distances, alti-
tudes, and relative bearings vulnerable to a false injection attack. In the event of a
TCAS anomaly in flight, the maps provide the pilot an extra tool in the determina-
tion between system failure due to outside influence or just mechanical system failure.
Also, the maps show that a false injection is quite possible in certain circumstances.
This show of success requires specific attention to possible solutions for this particular
attack and possibly other attacks mentioned in the threat taxonomy.
One major note from the maps is that a 0 degree relative bearing from the target
aircraft to the ground-based attacker presents the perfect scenario for false injection.
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As long as the attacker times the Mode S responses correctly, false injection attacks
are always successful with a 0 degree relative bearing.
Additionally, another major note is that the closer an attacker is horizontally to
the target aircraft, the more successful the false injection attack is. Since the aircraft
is closer, the TAU calculation always falls within the window of RA issuance, ≤ 35
seconds.
The last major takeaway from the maps is the increase in success of attack at lower
altitudes. As the altitude decreases, the success of false injection attacks broadens
across different relative bearings. The occurs due to the reduction in distance and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This academic thesis presented a comprehensive overview of threat actors and a
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) threat taxonomy. Additionally, the thesis
constructed a dynamic simulation, focused on timing interrogation responses while
satisfying varying TCAS tests and constraints. Upon simulation completion, the
thesis described a detailed analysis of security vulnerabilities. The thesis’s goal is to
enhance the TCAS security knowledge of companies and agencies that rely on the use
of TCAS. Additionally, the thesis aspires to drive research into TCAS vulnerability
solutions, specifically the spoofing vulnerability. Moreover, the thesis provides aircraft
pilots with a potential threat landscape while operating the aircraft. The impact that
TCAS has on government and citizen safety warrants clear knowledge of threats and
developed countermeasures.
This thesis provides a general landscape of threat actors, their capabilities, and
their potential attacks. Additionally, the thesis further studies the requirements for
the false injection attack and then performs a simulation to understand the success
rate of it. The simulation procedures include several steps. First, a threat actor model
is created, and with open-source documents, a vulnerability assessment is developed
for TCAS. Second, the requirements for interrogation timing, the range test, the
altitude test, the power test, and bearing constraints are discovered. Next, using
MATLAB, a simulation that calculates the required timing for TCAS interrogation
responses while satisfying all of the required tests is completed. Fourth, the analysis
of the results creates a probability of success for certain regions in a flight path and




[4] proposed and successfully created TCAS Mode S messages. This thesis orches-
trated the remaining requirements for a successful false injection attack. The ability
to create TCAS Mode S messages paired with known flight paths that successfully
satisfy range, altitude, power, and bearing requirements present a true attack vector
for adversaries discussed in this thesis. The success plausibility of this attack presents
doubt, even if minute, in the integrity of a TCAS screen. Doubt in integrity creates
distrust for pilots. A system responsible for numerous lives, necessitates complete
pilot trust, so solutions to this attack capability require exploration.
6.1.1 Proposed Solutions
A solution to the false injection vulnerability requires addressing the capability of
creating TCAS messages. Additionally, addressing the simplicity of the TCAS tests
and constraints further strains false injection capabilities.
TCAS accepts any TCAS message received from a correctly addressed aircraft
[46]. TCAS does not have an aircraft confirmation capability. A potential solution is
having TCAS systems communicate their current air picture. Discrepancies between
multiple TCAS systems require further investigation and the ability to discern real
and false aircraft. Further, this allows the verification of aircraft positioning data,
further enhancing the viability of a particular aircraft’s current TCAS picture.
Specifically addressing the viability of a ground-based attacker triggering a false
injection attack, the altitude processing of TCAS requires exploration. TCAS uses
altitude provided in Mode S messages during the placement of aircraft in its surround-
ing airspace. A plausible solution requires aircraft to verify altitude by a vertical angle
of arrival verification. The reported altitude and measured vertical angle of arrival
comparison gives TCAS an additional verification tool on determining requirements
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for RA issuance. Without a trusted altitude, aircraft cannot trigger an RA, only a
TA [11].
6.2 Future Work
In addition to future work in a security solution, the proposed false injection
attack requires additional research. The next two areas of focus are interrogation and
reply periodicity, or how often and dispersed are interrogations and their replies with
operational TCAS systems. Additionally, the TCAS message creation paired with
the timing and threat maps require real-world experimentation.
6.2.1 Interrogation/Reply Periodicity
Interrogations and replies have mandated timelines according to [30]. The delay
mandate of 132.75 microseconds between the first interrogation pulse and the first
interrogation reply pulse requires confirmation from active TCAS systems. The reply
delay allows the false injection to occur, and without the delay or jitter in the expected
delay, the false injection becomes less likely and most improbable. Measuring the
delay requires the monitoring of two operational TCAS systems communicating. The
delay becomes observable during the communication process.
6.2.2 Real-World Implementation
In addition to verification of interrogation and reply periodicity, the developed
timing capabilities and threat maps require validation with real-world systems. This
thesis provided threat maps based on publicly available information about TCAS.
The developed simulation provides TAU measurements for each range, altitude, and
relative bearing. Additionally, the simulation provides the required timing for each
message. An operational software-defined radio (SDR), antenna, and target TCAS
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afford the capability to test the threat maps and timing developed. The best course
of action requires starting with a stationary aircraft to verify the ability to trigger an
RA from different ranges, altitudes, and starting bearings.
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Acronyms
AC Altitude Code. 11
ACAS Aircraft Collision Avoidance System. 1
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 32
APT advanced persistent threat. 20, 30, 31
ATC air traffic control. 6, 13
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System. 7
CAASD Mitre Center for Advanced Aviation System Development. 7, 8
CIA confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 23
DABS Discrete Address Beacon System. 7
DF Downlink Format. 8, 10, 11, 49
DoS Denial-of-Service. 24, 26
FAA Federal Aviation Administration. 1, 7, 8, 13
IC interrogator code. 10
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization. 8, 10, 11, 27, 28
IFF Identification Friend or Foe. 6
MIT-LL Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Lincoln Laboratory. 7
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